This paper presents a theory of induced technological change in which firms pursue a random, 5 local, and bounded search for productivity-enhancing innovations. Firms implement profitable 6 innovations at fixed prices, which then spread through the economy. After diffusion, all firms 7 adjust prices and wages. The model is consistent with a variety of price-setting behaviors, which 8 determine equilibrium positions characterized by constant cost shares and productivity growth 9 rates. Target-return pricing yields Harrod-neutral technological change with a fixed wage share as 10 a stable equilibrium, consistent with Kaldor's stylized facts, while allowing for deviations from 11 equilibrium, as observed in the longer historical record. 12 13
Introduction

1
In a well-known paper, Kaldor (1961, pp . 178-179) introduced six "stylized facts", of 2 which the first four are: rising labor productivity and output; rising capital per worker; a 3 steady rate of profit; and steady capital-output ratios. The last two imply a steady profit 4 share, and thus a steady wage share. However, shortly after the publication of Kaldor's 5 paper, the wage share rose briefly in many high-income countries and then began to fall, 6 a trend that continues today. By compiling long historical data series, Maddison (1994, p. 7 10) demonstrated that capital productivity wanders over a wide range, without exhibiting 8 a long-run trend, suggesting that over many decades technological change appears to 9 have a weak Harrod-neutral tendency, but with substantial variations. Observations such 10 as these put Kaldor's stylized facts into question and renewed interest in a major concern 11 of the classical economists -the intersection between growth, distribution and 12 technological change (Acemoglu, 2002; Brugger & Gehrke, 2016 ; Tavani & Zamparelli, 13 2017). 14 The present paper is a contribution to this literature. It presents a theory of cost-share 15 induced technological change, an idea first proposed by Hicks (1932, p . 124 ff.). We 16 show that when combined with a price and wage-setting regime that leaves the profit and 17 wage shares fixed, the theory is consistent with Marx-biased technological change 18 (although other outcomes are possible). A regime of target-return pricing generates a 19 stable dynamic with Harrod-neutral technological change as the equilibrium position, 20 while allowing for substantial variation. 21 We build on a theory proposed by Duménil and Lévy (1995) , who sought, as we do, to 22 motivate a theory of cost-share induced technological change in order to explain the 23 observed behavior of labor productivity and capital-output ratios. Their theory is 24 evolutionary, in the sense of Nelson and Winter (1982) , in that innovation is stochastic, 25 locally bounded, and shaped by past decisions. They also follow Nelson and Winter (1982, pp. 168-169) by separating innovation into a series of distinct processes. With 1 Duménil and Lévy (1995), we view firms as seeking innovations in a bounded region 2 close to their existing technologies. They only accept innovations that increase their 3 profit rate under prevailing prices, which induces a bias in the direction of technological 4 change. Productivity change is random, and constrained by the potential for discovery. 5 In the theory presented in this paper, innovation is a microeconomic phenomenon, 6 located within the firm. It translates into macroeconomic impacts as innovations are taken 7 up by other firms (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 202) . Diffusion of innovations weakens the 8 temporary monopoly earned by the innovating firm, and all firms adjust their prices and 9 the wages they pay in response to the new cost structure, resulting in a new functional 10 income distribution. The innovating firm thus faces unintended consequences from its 11 innovation, as proposed by Marx. The functional income distribution which results from 12 their and other firms' innovation, followed by diffusion and price and wage adjustment, 13 induces subsequent rounds of innovation and price setting, thereby setting up a repeating 14 dynamic. 15 The price-and wage-setting step avoids the implication of Okishio's theorem (Okishio, 16 1961; Bowles, 1981) , which states that with fixed wage rates and the establishment of a 17 new set of Sraffian production prices, the rate of profit must rise. When wages and prices 18 are allowed to adjust dynamically after innovation and diffusion, the profit rate can rise, 19 fall, or stay the same, depending on the price-and wage-setting regime. 20 While we begin with Duménil and Lévy's (1995) model, we go significantly beyond it. 21 First, we relax their restrictive assumptions about technological discovery. Second, we 22 expand their model from two inputs to production -labor and capital -to an arbitrary 23 number. Third, we follow Kaldor (1961) (1964) responded to Salter by arguing that the entrepreneur should seek to minimize unit 14 costs within an "innovation-possibility frontier", which he acknowledged is a "disguised"
15
form of Kaldor's technical progress function. Given rather broad conditions for the shape 16 of the frontier, but arguing that it should not depend on the cost shares themselves, 17 Kennedy showed that his assumption implies technological change biased in the direction 18 of the factor with the highest cost share. can be more easily incorporated into pen-and-paper models of growth and distribution. 21 The theories of Kennedy (1964) than a series of leaps to close the gaps opened up by new advances (Basalla, 1988 ).
5
Consistent with our non-neoclassical orientation, we assume that prices are set by firms 6 engaged in oligopolistic competition (Coutts & Norman, 2013) , while wages are 7 influenced by social processes. Thus, both wage and price setting involves choice and 8 conflict, which adds a degree of freedom -and realism -lacking in neoclassical models. wages. 16 Duménil and Lévy's theory incorporates a version of Marxian unintended consequences. 17 Firms take the individually rational decision to adopt technologies that increase their rate Firms have a capital productivity κ and labor productivity λ. They have considerable 3 flexibility to set both wages and prices, employing labor at a wage w and setting a price 4 P. The profit rate r is then 5 1,
where π is the profit share. If a firm makes a discovery that would, if implemented, 7 change productivities by amounts Δκ, Δλ, the firm then asks whether implementing it will 8 raise profitability in the short run while keeping prices fixed. Using a hat to denote a 9 growth rate, ˆ,
where ω = 1 -π is the wage share. Firms adopt an innovation if it raises the profit rate at 12 constant costs, giving the viability condition 13 ˆ0 .
   (3) 14 We illustrate this condition for the average viable technology in . In the figure we 15 suppose, with Duménil and Lévy (1995) , that innovation is entirely neutral. Innovations 16 move productivities in a random direction, with a probability distribution that is 17 circularly symmetric and also symmetric around the    line. With these assumptions, 18 the firm is just as likely to make a labor-saving or a capital-saving innovation. However, . As shown, in both cases capital productivity is falling, because both 1  and 2  1 are negative. As the profit share rises, the vector rotates clockwise, so when π = 0.4, 2 capital productivity is falling more slowly, and labor productivity rising more slowly, 3 than when π = 0.3. As successful discoveries are implemented through innovation and emulation, firms 5 subsequently adjust their prices. 
A multi-factor viability condition 20
We continue to denote capital productivity by κ and the price level by P, but we now 21 allow for an arbitrary number of inputs, N, indexed by i = 1,…N, with costs per unit input 22 qi. Those inputs, including labor, are used in production with productivity νi, so the profit 23 rate is The expression in parentheses is the profit share,
5 while the cost share for each factor is 6 1 .
7
Using this notation, we can write equation (5) as
.
This equation, a generalization of equation (2) , is the change in the profit rate that would 10 obtain if a firm were to introduce the innovation. An innovation is viable if it increases 11 the profit rate, and should be rejected if it does not. That is, a viable technology should 12 satisfy ˆ0, r  or 13 10 .
14
To simplify the notation, we extend the set of factors to include capital, defining a cost , . 17 We can then write equation (9) The probability of acceptance ()   σν of a candidate innovation is shown schematically 10 in Figure 2 . It drops quickly to zero when the estimated change in profit rate is negative 11 and rises quickly to one when the estimated change is positive. innovations by their effect on productivities, and assume that any individual innovation is 6 drawn from a probability distribution ( ). f ν The average productivity improvement, ˆ,  ν 7 is then given by integrating over all possible values of ν that satisfy the viability 8 condition (11). We enforce the viability condition in a probabilistic form using the 9 probability of acceptance function ()   σν shown in Figure 2 , which is equal to one 10 when its argument becomes slightly positive and zero when its argument becomes 11 slightly negative,
13
The cost share σ only appears within the acceptance probability function in equation ( 
16
In this expression we have introduced the slope (or derivative) of the acceptance 17 probability function, ( ).   σν As shown in Figure 2 , the acceptance probability has zero 18 slope everywhere except very close to zero, where its slope becomes extremely large. 19 Equation (13) is an essential result. It holds for any innovation probability distribution 20 ( ), f ν so it is a more general and flexible expression than that found by Duménil and 21 Lévy (1995), who assumed a specific form for the probability distribution. By allowing 22 for an arbitrary innovation probability distribution, we address We can express the right-hand side of equation (13) as the entries Mij in a matrix M (the 1 Jacobian matrix),
3
As shown in the mathematical appendix, M is, to a good approximation, an
The properties of the M matrix characterize acceptable models of cost-share induced 7 technological change consistent with the assumptions that led to equation (12): aggregate 8 productivity change is an average over the randomly-distributed efforts of many firms, 9 with each firm accepting only those innovations that increase its profit rate at prevailing 10 prices and wages. From these properties, we get the immediate result that the own-11 response of the productivity growth rate to a change in the cost share is positive,
12
ˆ0
. 
Because M is symmetric, M01 = M10, and we find 5 01 10 00 constraints on the functional form of the cost share-productivity relationship. 
Capital accumulation and the Kaldor-Verdoorn law 11
Up to now, we have treated technological innovation as though it were independent of 12 capital accumulation. For disembodied innovation this is the case: changing operating 13 procedures, retrofitting, and learning-by-doing can lead to higher capital and labor 14 productivity. However, the resource-saving qualities of some innovations are embodied 15 in new capital. In this section we extend the theory to take capital accumulation into 16 account. 17 We start with a generic input X that is associated with a given capital stock, K. For Dividing both sides by X = xK, the growth rate of x is found to be 6 where gK = I/K is the gross investment rate. In a perpetual inventory model, the growth 7 rate of the capital stock is
9
Substituting this expression into equation (22) gives 11 The quantity in parentheses on the right-hand side of this equation is the relative 12 difference between the marginal and average values of the X-to-capital ratio, which we 13 denote by rx. The rate of change of the output-to-X ratio -the X-productivity νx -is then 14 given by 15 ˆˆˆ
16
Using the same expressions, but setting X equal to total output, Y, equation (24) gives an 17 expression for capital productivity growth, 21 This is the expression for X-productivity growth due to embodied technological change.
22
Regardless of the source of productivity change, whether embodied or disembodied, the 1 choice of technology is governed by the viability condition (9) . In the case of embodied 2 technological change, the equations above allow us to write the viability condition as 6 we find an expression equivalent to equation (11) Proceeding by analogy with the derivation for disembodied technical change, we have 10 where φz and fz are the equivalents, for the z variables, to the functions φ and f. This 11 expression is of precisely the same form as equation (12), and it has similar properties.
12
Firms may discover, in any time step, a number of possible innovations. Some will 13 involve embodied technological change and others disembodied technological change. 14 The first type are governed by equation (31), which we summarize by gK multiplied by a 15 function Ψi(σ). The second are characterized by equation (12), which we summarize by a 16 function Φi(σ). Combining the two sources of change, the average rate of productivity 17 change is given by
This is a generalization of the Kaldor-Verdoorn law. In the Kaldor-Verdoorn law, Ψi(σ) 20 and Φi(σ) are constants, but here they are functions of the cost shares. The gross investment rate gK may also depend on cost shares, so, through equation (32), 2 productivity growth rates can have a complex dependence on the cost share. 3 Separating embodied and disembodied technological change thus allows for richer 4 dynamics, and the theory developed in this paper offers a generalized form of the Verdoorn law. However, in order to simplify the examples, we do not explore it further in 6 this paper. 
An equilibrating dynamic 8
The theory of cost share induced technological change present above suggests that aside 
ˆ0
Thus, a rise (fall) in the cost share of a factor stimulates faster (slower) productivity 13 growth in that factor. We have provided a justification for the assumption using a general 14 probabilistic model of innovation, along with constraints on the relationship between cost 15 shares and productivity growth rates. 16 After innovation and diffusion, all firms respond to productivity changes by setting prices 17 (following their pricing policies) and wages (through tacit or explicit negotiation with 18 their employees). From the expression for the cost shares in equation (7), the subsequent 19 growth in cost shares is, using the average productivity growth rate,
20
 ˆ.
The term in parentheses is a vector of growth rates of real unit costs. These, in turn, can 22 be expected to respond to changes in productivity. From equation (34), an increase in the 23 cost share associated with input i leads to a rise in its productivity growth rate.
24
Subsequently, from equation (35), the cost share is driven downward, so this is an 25 equilibrating process. The equilibrium is reached when cost shares and productivity 1 growth rates are not changing:ˆ0.     νσ 2 An equilibrium, once established, can be disturbed by changes in pricing strategy -e.g., 3 from a fixed mark-up to target-return pricing -or by changes in technological potential as 4 captured in the probability distribution ( ). f ν We explore this possibility in the next 5 section. 6 5 Applying the theory to a classically-inspired growth model 7 In this section we apply the theory elaborated above to a simple classically-inspired 8 growth model with two inputs to production -labor and capital. In constructing the 9 model we largely follow Foley and Michl (1999 The conditions expressed by equations (37) and (38) distinguish different pricing regimes 4 that depend on firms' accounting practices and the ability of workers to influence their 5 wages. 6 
Capital and labor productivity 7
For purposes of presentation it is helpful to have a specific model for capital and labor determines the other two coefficients, which allows us to write
12
These partial derivatives correspond to the following two functions, 15 The expression for capital productivity growth will prove to be particularly convenient 16 when considering target-return pricing. ,
, or any other function of order negative one in the cost shares. This particular choice leads to a convenient expression for the capital productivity growth rate.
1
,
These expressions will not change unless the parameters k, ℓ, or a change. Suppose that, 3 initially,
With this assumption, capital productivity is constant (by design), while labor 6 productivity is growing at a rate 11 Gordon (1999 Gordon ( , 2012 Gordon ( , 2016 has suggested that the pattern changed because the potential 12 for innovation was declining at the end of a wage of technological progress that started in 13 the late 19 th century 10 . In the theory presented in this paper, Gordon's suggestion 14 translates into a contraction of the probability distribution () f ν of new discoveries. We 15 can implement Gordon's hypothesis by proposing that k changes to a new value . kk  
16
After the change, capital productivity growth becomes
18 10 We do not advocate either for or against Gordon's thesis. The validity of the cost-share induced theory of technological change does not depend on it. Oil crises, war, social conflict, the decline of industrial production, and gradually weakening unions could all have plausibly influenced cost shares, wage determination, and pricing strategies. For the purposes of this paper, the virtue of Gordon's mechanism is that it can be implemented in a straightforward manner by changing one or two model parameters.
Thus, under mark-up pricing, after the probability distribution of new discoveries 1 contracts, capital productivity begins to shrink, and continues to shrink indefinitely. 2 Labor productivity continues to grow at the same pace. 3 The combination of a constant profit share and falling capital productivity corresponds to 4 the conditions in high-income countries that prevailed through the 1970s to the early 5 1980s. From equation (37), with a fixed profit share, if the capital productivity is falling 6 then the profit rate is also falling. We therefore find Marx-biased technological change as 7 a special -but important -case of a fixed profit share. 
Harrod-neutral technological change under target-return pricing 9
During the 1980s, the position of labor was considerably weakened, effectively vanishing 10 by the 1990s, a few years into what Goldstein (2012) has called the "shareholder value 11 era". Whether labor's decline was driven by falling profitability or other causes is a moot 12 point, but the increasing strength of firms and their investors vis-à-vis labor allowed firms 13 to set prices so as to achieve desired returns. Substituting from equation (41), we can write this as
The solution is a trajectory that asymptotically approaches a new equilibrium, The combination of steady profit rate, falling capital productivity, slowing labor 13 productivity growth, and rising profit share, characterized the 1990s in high-income 14 countries. The 1980s were a transitional period. 15 
Growth and distribution 16
We now consider the two cases described above -fixed profit share and fixed profit 17 rate -in a simple classically-inspired growth model, by adding capital accumulation. 18 Following Foley and Michl (1999, p. 98) capitalists' net income is the net profit rate (the 19 gross profit rate, r, less the depreciation rate δ) multiplied by the previous-period capital 20 stock, K-1. That income is then divided between net investment (the difference between 21 current and previous-period capital stocks) and capitalists' consumption Cc,
If the capitalists' marginal rate of saving out of end-of-period wealth is β, then
Substituting into equation (53) gives a growth rate of the capital stock gK that depends on 2 the rate of profit, 4 Output, Y, is given by the product of capital productivity and the capital stock, 6 while the real wage per worker depends on both the profit share and labor productivity,
Employment, L, is the ratio of GDP to labor productivity, 10 In Figure 3 we show indices for κ, r, π, w, Y, and L, as generated by this model. We 11 assume firms to set a target profit rate starting in year 20. The profit rate ramps up to its 12 final value, which is achieved in year 30. 13 To generate the curves in Figure 3 , we set a to 1.75%/year and k to 3.25%/year, 14 corresponding to a profit share of 35%. Labor productivity growth is determined by 15 setting ℓ to 0.40%/year. Capital productivity, κ, starts at 0.3/year. In the first decade, 16 steady capital accumulation and a constant capital productivity lead to steadily rising 17 GDP. The real wage rises at the same as the growth rate of labor productivity, so the 18 profit share remains at 35%. Employment expands modestly because GDP is growing 19 faster than labor productivity.
20
In year 10, we assume that k falls to 80% of its initial value, causing capital productivity 21 to begin to fall, while ℓ declines to -0.04%/year, causing labor productivity growth to 22 slow. As the wage continues to grow at historical rates, the profit share falls, and as the 23 GDP growth rate falls below the labor productivity growth rate, employment begins to with stagnant wages. 7 The event that drives the scenario is a contraction in the technological frontier starting in 8 year 10. This corresponds to Gordon's (1999 Gordon's ( , 2012 Gordon's ( , 2016 proposed mechanism. The 9 divergent trajectory after that event in Figure 3 follows from changes in price-and wage-10 setting behaviors. Initially, firm wage-and price-setting strategies are aligned, in which a 11 steady increase in the wage rate is consistent with a fixed mark-up. However, the 12 alignment depends on a steady labor and capital productivity growth rates. Once they 13 begin to slow in year 10, the contradictions become apparent. Firms shift to target-return generates an unstable dynamic that pushes the cost share of one of the factors upward 25 without limit. At some point the cost will be high enough that we expect it to spur a shift 1 to a different technological regime; for example, toward more energy-efficient capital. 2 The constraints on the matrix M can potentially be tested empirically, but tests using 3 macroeconomic data will be difficult. The reason is that M characterizes the change 4 within a firm, before the technology spreads, triggering changes in prices and wages. 5 Macroeconomic data reflect the full process of firm-level innovation followed by 6 diffusion and wage and price adjustment. Tests of the constraints on M must be carried 7 out using microeconomic data at the level of the appropriate decision unit. 8 Alternatively, the underlying assumptions of the model can also be explored using That means that the matrix of derivatives, M, must be of order negative one in the cost 10 shares. 
Complementary factors as a special case 12
The positivity of the own-response in (16) does not guarantee that the total response of 13 the productivity growth rate of a particular factor to a rise in the cost share will generally 14 be positive. A possible exception can arise when two factors are complementary. We say 15 that two factors i and j are complements if Mij is positive, and substitutes if negative. 16 The distinction between complements and substitutes is important when determining the 17 total change in productivity growth rates. Cost shares must sum to one, so any increase in 18 the cost share of one factor must be compensated by a net decrease in the cost shares of 19 other factors. The most problematic case arises when price and wage setting dynamics are 20 such that an increase z in the cost share for factor i is compensated entirely by a fall in the 21 cost share for a complementary factor j, 
